Canadian Politics 101 - For my non-Canadian peeps :-)

The Executive Dominance


Canada's parliamentary system is based on responsible government, within which the Executive is responsible to the legislature or the House of Commons. The Executive constitutes the cabinet, which consists of the Prime Minister (PM) who determines the Cabinet membership by appointing Members of Parliament from the House of Commons. The ministers within Cabinet are heads of ministry who have final decision-making authority on matters affecting the department. As a coordinating body, the Cabinet performs an essential function in forging the necessary consensus among ministers in order to establish the governments overall direction and to maintain Cabinet solidarity, under the Prime Minister's leadership. Conversely, the House of Commons is a body to which the executive must always turn for approval of its decisions and justifications of its actions. The house represents the public opinion and acts constantly in seeing that such opinion is always brought to the attention of the government of the day. The house as a whole will offer advice, encouragement, guidance, and support as well as criticism to the Cabinet (Canadian, 1997).

The above represents how in theory the Executive and the Legislature (House of Commons) should work together in the Canadian parliamentary system. In practice, however, the Executive branch has an overwhelming large influence on how the House of Commons votes. Canada has a parliamentary system of government that requires that the party in power maintain the support and confidence of the majority of the members of the Legislative branch (Charlton et al, 1998). Without this support, the government would find it difficult to carry out the mandate on which it is elected and, more important, to remain in power (Charlton et al, 1998). The role of Members of Parliament (MPs) in the ruling party is primarily of that of the National representative rather than a delegate of the riding. In addition, the political culture favours party loyalty and discipline thereby not welcoming dissidents. Furthermore, the Canadian constitution supports the executive dominance. With the accepted convention of party discipline, Member of Parliaments have little or no influence in demanding that the executive maintain the confidence of the House of Commons.

The role of MPs in the ruling party is primarily of that of the National representative rather than a delegate of the riding. Due to this dual function of the MP the ability to levy non-confidence votes or grant confidence to the executive through passages of bills is somewhat limited. Even if an MP was to dissent from the party lines the consequences of disobedience are known and accepted. By way of illustration, during the 35th Parliament (1993-7) John Nunziata was expelled from the Federal Liberal Party because he protested the 1996 budget over the government's failure to rescind the infamous Goods and Service Tax (GST) (Docherty, 1997). Two years earlier, veteran Liberal Warren Allmand voted against the government's first budget, which he claimed 'broke traditional liberal principles' (Docherty, 1997). Chretien reacted in traditional prime ministerial fashion: he removed Mr. Allmand as chair of the justice committee (Docherty, 1997). As such, with the "…straight jacket of party control worn by MPs…" (White, 2001) and the understood repercussions of dissent, MPs are under great pressure to conform to their leaders if they want to maintain their own survival in the political life. Due to this, MPs in the ruling party have little influence in demanding that the executive maintain the confidence of the House.

In addition, the political culture favours party loyalty and discipline thereby not welcoming dissidents. Our media is very quick to ascribe any signs of independence by members of party as evidence of weak leadership, thereby reinforcing the power of party leaders (Fraser Institute). The PM and the Cabinet ministers are simultaneously members of the legislature and the Executive (Mackenzie, 2000). Due to this, parliamentary majority can be assured of legislative support on most of the bills and programs that the government wishes to enact. This party solidarity is essential especially during House sessions and in the public. Cabinet solidarity, or collective ministerial responsibility, allows ministers to be frank in private but requires them to support the government in public (Jackson, 2001). The convention of collective responsibility is so pervasive that ministers are expected to support each other even before the issue has been discussed in parliament (Jackson, 2001). Cabinet deliberations are held in secret, individual opinions are not publicly voiced, and ministers are not supposed to speak or act except in the name of the entire Cabinet (Jackson, 2001). Cabinet policy becomes government policy and backbenchers have little choice but to vote in obedience to the party and PM (Jackson, 2001). If there is no support from the parliament a government has no choice (by convention) to dissolve government and call for elections. As such, the survival of the party in government depends on the solidarity of its member. Consequently, Canadian political culture reinforces party discipline leaving MPs with little influence in demanding that the executive maintain confidence of the House of Commons.

Furthermore, the Canadian constitution supports the executive dominance. In the Houses of Commons party discipline is a feature inherent in the Canadian model of parliament and is inextricably linked to the concept of responsible government and the confidence convention (Charlton et al, 1998). The Constitution Act 1867 established that Canada would have a responsible Cabinet/Parliamentary system of government (Charlton et al, 1998). Strong parties, based on broad consensus, are thus vital to the effective functioning of responsible government and the Canadian state (Charlton et al, 1998). Party solidarity, the apex of which is party discipline, is the guiding principle of the party system in Canada (Charlton et al, 1998). MPs in the ruling party run under the banner of that particular party and seek privileges offered by it because they are in general agreement with its broad base of national policy directions, directions that can be influenced and adjusted in caucus only (Charlton et al, 1998). Recognizing the above, MPs do have the ability to hold the executive accountable and demand their confidence but only in caucus or in Cabinet. Outside of those realms the MPs in the ruling party have little ability to check the actions of the Executive in public. As such, the ability to levy non-confidence votes in the House of Commons is not a favoured convention in the Canadian parliamentary system. Thus reinforcing the importance of party discipline in the parliamentary system.

In conclusion, confidence is the central control mechanism by which the Premier prevents variations in the proposed laws and budget by the legislature (Fraser Institute). Culture causes MPs to police themselves because they do not want their political careers to end. It is through party discipline that a party can attain a majority government so that a mandate is established and policies passed. The prospects of minority governments have been greatly enhanced following the growth of the Reform Party and the Bloc Quebecois (Charlton et al, 1998). In the context of this development, the importance of party discipline increases exponentially (Charlton et al, 1998). A lack of party discipline during a minority government would result in a chaotic situation where no prime minister could maintain the confidence of the House (Charlton et al 1998, 42). Thus majority governments are needed to enforce party discipline not only to enact its legislative program, but also for the sake of its own self-preservation (Charlton et al, 1998). With the accepted convention of party discipline, and the concept being entrenched into the Canadian constitution, MPs have little or no influence in demanding that the executive maintain the confidence of the House of Commons.

REFERENCES
Canadian Government Programs and Services. Commerce Clearing House, Canadian Ltd
1997

Charlton, Mark and Paul Barker (eds). Contemporary Political Issues 3ed Scarborough:
Nelson Canada, 1998.

Docherty, David C. Mr. Smith Goes to Ottawa. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997

Fraser Institute. "The Obstacles to Empowering MPs and MLAs: What it would take to
Empower them". Reforming Politics: The BC Blueprint
http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/shared/readmore.asp?sNav=pb&id=299
visited site: March 12, 2002

Jackson, Robert J and Doreen Jackson. Politics in Canada: Culture, Institutions,
Behaviour, and Public Policy 5th ed. Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2001

Mackenzie, Judith. Lecture notes for Canadian Government POLS*2300. University of Guelph. Fall 2000

White, Ted. "Freedom of the MP within a Party Structure". Reforming Politics: The BC
Blueprint November 22, 2001 Speech. Frasier Institute.
http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/shared/readmore.asp?sNav=pb&id=299
visited site: March 12, 2000